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“The Dark Corners of the World”:
International Criminal Law & the Global South
John Reynolds & Sujith Xavier†

In the dark corners of the world lurks the future of armed conflict. … The real threat to
humanity on several levels is bred in the fields of lawlessness in the third world. ... Conflicts
in these dark corners are evolving into uncivilized events.1

1. Introduction
In the spring of 2011, following the publication of a UN report detailing potential
international crimes committed in the Sri Lankan conflict,2 representatives from
Tamil communities converged on the Hague to call for action by the International
Criminal Court. Maheswaran Ponnampalam, chairman of the Tamil Danish
Association, spoke of activists who had cycled over a thousand kilometres to join the
demonstrations: ‘It took them 18 days to get here by bike, but they made it. We have
sent multiple letters to the prosecutor of the ICC asking for action. We never got a
response. That’s why we are here.’3 Since 2009, from the streets of Chennai to the
highways of Toronto, Tamil voices in their tens of thousands have been united across
core/periphery lines by a repeated rallying cry: international criminal accountability
for war crimes committed by Sri Lankan state forces in their onslaught against the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.4 Palestinian civil society too has, for some time
now, pinned similar hopes of redress for Israeli military atrocities and colonisation on
the International Criminal Court, and has pushed its political and diplomatic
representatives to pursue the transfer of jurisdiction to the Hague.5
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Such impulses from the global South to appeal to liberal rule of law
sensibilities reveal both the allure and the pitfalls of public international law’s
criminal responsibility project. The allure is encapsulated in the illusion of
universality, promises of accountability and deterrence, and a documented chronicle
of history bearing the imprint of legal legitimacy.6 The pitfalls lie in international
criminal law’s historically contingent doctrines and embedded political and economic
biases; its instrumentality and selectivity.7 In the outlook of international criminal
prosecutors like David Crane, the global South is an unruly space to which the rule of
law must be delivered as part of the newfangled civilising mission. International
criminal law, in that sense, is aligned with an imperial discourse devoted to imposing
“good governance” techniques and free market ideology.8
Despite this, self-determination and popular movements in Palestine, Sri
Lanka and elsewhere continue to be enticed by international criminal law as a
potentially emancipatory project. Our aim in this article is to peer inside the structural
and ideological anatomy of the international criminal law enterprise—as a mechanism
of political economy in addition to global governance—from a vantage point of the
global South. The national liberation struggles in Palestine and Sri Lanka,
representative of the barbarity implicit in Crane’s “dark corners of the world”
metaphor, offer a window for this examination.
We begin in section two by reflecting broadly on discourses of international
criminal law and its exponents as they relate to the global South. Section three then
proceeds to explore one particularly contentious issue in the politics of international
criminal law – that of selectivity. The role of the UN Security Council, in creating
international tribunals and referring cases to the International Criminal Court, offers
one window into the politics of inclusion and exclusion when it comes to who, and
what, is ultimately prosecuted. The final section asks whether, given certain
embedded colonial features, the premise and promise of international criminal justice
can—for the global South—be anything more than illusory, or whether, drawing on
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TWAIL (Third World Approaches to International Law) perspectives, a
“decolonisation” of international criminal justice might be conceivable.

2. International Criminal Justice Discourses & the Global South
International law’s criminal justice project has been a distinctly western venture. Its
crystallisation at Nuremberg was ‘an expression of a peculiarly American legal
sensibility’.9 The irony of Nuremberg, in seeking to claim the moral high ground
following military victory over the Nazis and by holding Nazism’s particular brand of
racial supremacy to legal account, ‘was that the adjudicating states either condoned
(or practiced as official policy) their own versions of racial mythologies’.10 There was
no question of a similar normative conception of criminal accountability attaching to
British and French violence in the colonies, or to the subjugation of native Americans
and African Americans in the United States.11
Third World jurists were wise to such selectivity and structural biases from the
outset. India’s Judge Radhabinod Pal was the most prominent among a range of Asian
and Latin American voices of scepticism; his 1,235-page dissent from the judgment of
the Tokyo Tribunal denounced the Japanese prosecutions as ‘vindictive retaliation’12
and colonialism by the war’s victors. With the atomic bombing of Japan and acts of
colonial aggression and annexation by Western powers exempted from any form of
judicial scrutiny, Pal maintained that the Tribunal was structurally incapable of being
just.13 He was sharply critical of the decision by the Allied Powers to mandate the
Tribunal to retroactively prosecute previously undefined crimes. This, Pal asserted,
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brought international law back to its colonial foundations and its facilitation of
conquest.14
The more contemporaneous proliferation of international criminal law since
the 1990s has emerged in a distinct political context in terms of core/periphery
relations: “post”-colonialism and formal sovereign equality; purported universality of
legal norms; economic exploitation and structural inequalities configured in less overt
forms and obscured behind the masks of aid and development.15 Against this
backdrop, demands for international justice – across political, economic and
environmental spectra – are often seen as emanating from an aggrieved global South.
The response from Northern sites of power has typically been to create controlled,
technical expert-driven international institutions. This has come to include criminal
tribunals for the purposes of addressing the conduct of war and the perpetration of
direct physical violence, amongst other tools of transitional justice.16
The two ad hoc tribunals were initially viewed suspiciously from the global
South, with the Rwanda Tribunal seen as a tokenistic corollary of its Balkan
counterpart. The creation of International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda had been
rendered unavoidable only by the immediate Yugoslav precedent and belated western
guilt over the Rwandan genocide. Fast forward a decade to the emergence of the
permanent international criminal court, however, and support for that enterprise from
states and civil society on the African continent, in particular, was markedly more
enthusiastic. Swift and widespread ratification of the Rome Statute bore witness to
that. In seeking to explain why, contrary to expectations in Rome, the Court was so
warmly embraced by states from Africa, international criminal law scholars framed its
lure in opposition to other international institutions that had proved unwilling or
unable to address African concerns. In this telling, ‘they turned to a new experiment
in global justice that did not seem to be characterized by the traditional dialectic of
north and south, rich and poor, first world and third world, Great Powers and

Justice Pal states: “When international law will have to allow a victor nation thus to define a crime at
his will, it will […] find itself back on the same spot whence it started on its apparently onward journey
several centuries ago”; Ibid., at 23-24.
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everyone else. The Court appeared genuinely egalitarian in structure and profoundly
fair in conception.’17
Appearances, of course, can be deceptive. The role given to the Security
Council implied a preservation of pre-existing power dynamics and amounted to little
more than ‘a rusty façade’ to shield the permanent members from exposure to
jurisdiction, prompting Immi Tallgren to ask from the outset: ‘Are we not just writing
yet another chapter to the stale story of the Strong and the Weak in international
law?’18 And yet, while actual progress in prosecuting even the weak has been stilted
at best since the coming into force of the Rome Statute in 2002, the progress narrative
around the International Criminal Court remains irrepressible. Remarks framing
international criminal law as ‘the most profound current aspect of international law’19
are as commonplace now as they were at the Rome Conference. An inversion of sorts
in global North-South dynamics around the court has also occurred, however. While
the United States has abandoned its initial reticence and warmed to the project
somewhat, the African Union’s love for this latest chapter in ‘the new tribunalism’20
is turning notably cold. This has been fuelled by unmistakeable selectivity and
geographic bias, whereby the investigation and prosecution of Africans is
resoundingly more palatable and expedient for Western powers than that of Canadian,
British or Israeli officials.
From a moment of apparent convergence between calls for justice from the
global South and the materialisation of a “hard” international criminal law, what has
emerged is a project that reveals and reproduces much of the international legal
terrain’s embedded colonial architecture. In both its normative and institutional
conceptualisations, and now its functioning in practice, international criminal law
opens itself up to some obvious critiques from a TWAIL perspective. Foremost
among them, is the question of who is prosecuted, and by whom. The fact of some
W. Schabas, ‘The Banality of International Justice’, 11 Journal of International Criminal Justice
(2013) 545, at 548. Alternate explanations for the high level of ratifications by African states include
the desire to signal their human rights credentials to, and in some cases to satisfy the explicit conditions
of, foreign donors.
18
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at 695.
19
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Law: Critical Perspectives (Ashgate, 2013), at 475.
20
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“self-referrals” from African jurisdictions has not carried sufficient resonance as to
overcome the sense of an expert class21, the professional centre, administering justice
to the periphery. Despite concerted work by civil society organisations and social
movements to push the Office of the Prosecutor to act on allegations against British
forces in Iraq, Canada’s treatment of Afghan detainees, or the crimes of western allies
in Israel and Colombia, the International Criminal Court’s reputation remains
tarnished by a failure to cast its prosecutorial net beyond Africa.
The colonial intimations of that relationship were epitomised in the image of
former Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo emerging from his helicopter on the green
plains of the Democratic Republic of the Congo sporting the starchest of white suits.22
Makau Mutua’s “savage-victim-saviour”23 triangulation is instantaneously evoked;
Ocampo the embodiment of the crusading knight in shining linen on hand to save
disempowered victims from the savagery of their own.24 He has not been alone in this
ideological expedition. David Crane, the first prosecutor of the Special Court for
Sierra Leone, in situating himself at ‘the cutting edge of international law with all its
professional excitement at the legal, political, and diplomatic levels’, is forthright in
acknowledging the role of his institution in ‘imposing white man’s justice upon third
world conflicts’.25 In a moment of profound introspection, he asks whether ‘the
international justice we seek to impose’ is the same justice that ‘the victims of a third
world conflict seek’,26 and concedes some hard truths:
We simply don’t think about or factor in the justice the victims seek. … We
approach the insertion of international justice paternalistically. I would even
say with a self-righteous attitude that borders on the ethnocentric. … We
consider our justice as the only justice. … We don’t contemplate why the
tribunal is being set up, and for whom it is being established. … After set up,
B.S. Chimini, ‘Prolegomena to a Class Approach to International Law’, 21 European Journal of
International Law (2010) 57; S. Xavier, ‘Theorising Global Governance Inside Out: A Response to
Professor Ladeur’, 3 Transnational Legal Theory (2012) 268.
22
Preserved for posterity on the cover poster of Barry Stevens’ 2011 documentary, Prosecutor. See
also D. Saunders, ‘International Law Should Not Be a White-Suited Hero’, published in The Globe and
Mail as ‘Ocampo’s Crusades Tainted the Idea of International Justice’, 25 February 2012.
23
M. Mutua, ‘Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights’, 42 Harvard
International Law Journal (2001) 201.
24
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1985 “Trial of the Juntas”, which is illustrative of the ways in which global South elites are implicated
in international institutional imperialism, and of the fact that being an international lawyer from the
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25
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26
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we don’t create mechanisms by which we can consider the cultural and
customary approaches to justice within the region.27
While acknowledging this paternalism, self-righteousness and ethnocentrism, Crane
at the same time indulges in it, arguing that any endeavour to contemplate local or
regional alternatives to white man’s justice ‘runs smack into a brick wall when
considering locally, culturally oriented justice vis-à-vis Africa, a continent led by a
brotherhood where the rule of law is a tool by which to seek and maintain power’.28
This may appear cynical to his audience, the former Special Court prosecutor warns,
but: ‘it is true from my perspective and experience living and working at the edge of
the world—West Africa.’29 Oscillating between respect and revile for west African
culture, Crane, in a quintessentially Orientalist rendition, goes to some length to
emphasise his credentials and expertise on the region: ‘As a student of West African
culture, with a graduate degree in West African Studies, I traveled to Sierra Leone
with an appreciation of the rich and vibrant culture of the region and factored that into
my general and prosecutorial strategy’.30
What that entails, apparently, is an understanding of west Africa (in its
entirety) as ‘a lawless land … a region that has never really known the rule of law’.31
It is in the global South, Crane’s “dark corners of the world”, that this lawlessness
breeds real and imminent threat to what “we” understand as humanity and
civilisation.32
Fertilized by greed and corruption, what grows out of these regions of the
world are terror, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Conflicts in these
dark corners are evolving into uncivilized events. They appear to be less
political and are more criminal in origin and scope. […] Respect for the law of
armed conflict decreases or disappears entirely in this new type of warfare as
the involvement of the criminal element increases. … These dark corners
become havens for these criminal elements.33
27
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Ibid., at 1686.
29
Ibid., at 1686.
30
Ibid., at 1685.
31
D. Crane, ‘Dancing with the Devil: Prosecuting West Africa’s Warlords: Building Initial
Prosecutorial Strategy for an International Tribunal after Third World Armed Conflicts’, 37 Case
Western Reserve Journal of International Law (2005-2006) 1, at 2, 8.
32
On the ‘we’ of international criminal law, see I. Tallgren, ‘We Did It? The Vertigo of Law and
Everyday Life at the Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court’,
12 Leiden Journal of International Law (1999) 683.
33
D. Crane, ‘Dancing with the Devil: Prosecuting West Africa’s Warlords: Building Initial
Prosecutorial Strategy for an International Tribunal after Third World Armed Conflicts’, 37 Case
Western Reserve Journal of International Law (2005-2006) 1, at 4.
28

7

The framing of Third World conflicts as apolitical, of course, elides the impact of
imperial and neoliberal world-systems dynamics on underdeveloped regions that are
exploited for their natural resources, and allows for a technocratic response based on
simple criminality/legality binaries.34 Crane himself though appears to run into
contradictions even in attempting to deploy this reductive discourse. He claims that
the ‘corruption so endemic in these societies that fosters a healthy lack of respect for
institutions of any kind’, and invokes Louis Brandeis to underline that ‘[i]f we desire
respect for the law we must first make the law respectable’.35 In his ensuing
discussion, however, Crane offers nothing to suggest that he actually does see a
certain wariness of institutionalised structures as healthy, nor does he entertain
Brandeis’ notion of the law’s potential respectability deficit in the context of Sierra
Leone and Liberia. Quite the contrary: lack of respect for the law and for institutions
is the powder keg that ignites criminality and warmongering in the region. The rule of
law is the only satisfactory extinguisher: ‘at the end of the day, the citizens of a war
torn region must come to understand three things related to the law, that it is fair, that
no one is above it, and that the rule of law is far more powerful than the rule of the
gun’.36 This idealised rule of law stands in marked contrast to the state of nature
depicted by the prosecutor in the trials of Revolutionary United Front leaders,
whereby Sierra Leone is the setting for ‘a tale of horror, beyond the gothic into the
realm of Dante’s inferno’.37
Given the failure of the African sovereign state, the international criminal
institution offers the only viable answer. Thus, following the semblance of an
apparently sensible approach to local engagement (albeit couched in management
speak38), as both practitioner and scholar Crane abstains from any attempt to consider
alternatives to the imposition of justice from above. Instead, his concern is with the
politics and public relations of how best to counter populist claims of colonialism:
K. Clarke, ‘The Rule of Law Through Its Economies of Appearances: The Making of the African
Warlord’, 18 Indiana Journal of Legal Studies (2011) 7.
35
D. Crane, ‘Dancing with the Devil: Prosecuting West Africa’s Warlords: Building Initial
Prosecutorial Strategy for an International Tribunal after Third World Armed Conflicts’, 37 Case
Western Reserve Journal of International Law (2005-2006) 1, at 4 (emphasis added), quoting Louis D.
Brandeis, The Brandeis Guide to the Modern World (Alfred Lief ed., 1941), at 166.
36
Ibid., at 8. Emphasis added.
37
Transcript, Sesay, Kallon, and Gbao (SCSL-04-15-T), Trial Chamber, 5 July 2004, at 19.
38
‘Get out and listen to the citizens of the region. Interface with them.’ D. Crane, ‘White Man’s
Justice: Applying International Justice after Regional Third World Conflicts’, 27 Cardozo Law Review
(2006) 1683, at 1687.
34
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African leaders can easily manipulate popular thinking by loudly declaring
that the justice being imposed (and threatening the status quo or a leader’s
power) is “white man’s justice,” playing upon the fears of colonialism as a
way of excusing the rampant corruption and impunity that is Africa,
particularly West Africa. This is a real problem and without the careful
consideration by all of us on how best to come up with practical ways to
counter the “white man’s justice,” claims by cynical African politicians, and
others, establishing the rule of law permanently there will be illusory.’39
In advocating ‘the imposition of international justice norms in an African context’,40
Crane’s vision of justice is, ultimately, what he unashamedly describes as white
man’s justice, implemented through the universalising discourse of international
norms. ‘At the end of the day, Africans will have to decide on how best to tackle
corruption and lack of good governance’; if they fail to accept the norms imposed,
however, ‘Africa will move backwards and become the shanty town of the global
community’.41 While Crane may be at the more extreme (or honest) end of the
spectrum of Eurocentric paternalism, his stance is representative of much of the
disciplinary thinking and world-views that have underpinned the development and
operation of international criminal institutions.
In his dissection of selected witness testimony at the Special Court for Sierra
Leone, legal anthropologist Gerhard Anders points to the soliciting of certain
witnesses by the prosecution that tended ‘to represent the accused persons as absolute
evil, and Africa as primitive and lawless’; that ‘spoke to a deep-seated Western
fascination for Africa’s “savagery” and “primitivism”’.42 Certain events were
deliberately highlighted in the prosecution’s witness examination, even though they
occurred outside the territorial and temporal jurisdiction of the court, ‘because they
resonated with entrenched Western stereotypes of African “culture”.’43 Anders notes
that Crane’s depictions of the “dark corners of the world” evokes a distinctly
Conradian image of Africa as ‘one of the dark places of the earth’44; the exemplary

D. Crane, ‘White Man’s Justice: Applying International Justice after Regional Third World
Conflicts’, 27 Cardozo Law Review (2006) 1683, at 1686.
40
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‘racialized dualism of white/dark’.45 Conrad’s exploration of colonialism is, of course,
not simply black and white; Marlow’s dual voices in Heart of Darkness (one
denouncing colonialism, the other idealising it) find echoes in international criminal
law’s own dualism (universality versus selectivity) as well as Crane’s vacillation
between respect and repugnance for native Sierra Leone. Here, ‘the corrupting effects
of colonialism at both personal and political level’46 are mirrored in the effects of
being an international criminal law professional discharging the vestiges of colonial
justice.
The reality of western universalism has been a significant part of the story of the
African Union reconsidering its relationship with the International Criminal Court.47
The primary focus of the October 2013 Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the
African Union was Africa’s Relationship with the International Criminal Court. The
session culminated in a decision which expressed a number of the African Union’s
concerns around the Court and called for, amongst other things, the setting up of a
contact group of the African Union Council to engage with the UN Security Council
members ‘on all concerns of the AU on its relationship with the ICC, including the
deferral of the Kenyan and Sudanese cases’.48 Certainly, the narrative of international
criminal law as an imperial or colonial imposition has been co-opted to a certain
degree by post-colonial elites, as evidenced in the African Union discourse generally,
and the moves of specific national leaders and institutions.49 That the African Union
requests were promptly rejected in November 2013 by the Security Council, however,
brings into sharp focus once more the Council’s operative role in relation to the
International Criminal Court.

V. Nesiah, ‘Placing International Law: White Spaces on a Map’, 16 Leiden Journal of International
Law (2003) 1, at 4.
46
A. Anghie & B.S. Chimni, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law and Individual
Responsibility in Internal Conflicts’, 2 Chinese Journal of International Law (2003) 77, at 100.
47
This has not been the only stimulant, however, with the ICC serving in some instances as a site for
domestic politics and self-interests to be pursued, as exemplified in the Kenya situation, as well as the
African Union making pointed legal arguments over questions of head of state immunity. See A.
Kiyani, ‘Al-Bashir & the ICC: The Problem of Head of State Immunity’, 12 Chinese Journal of
International Law (2013) 467.
48
Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Addis Ababa, 11-12 October 2013,
Decision no. 1: Decision on Africa’s Relationship with the International Criminal Court (ICC),
Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec.1.
49
See, for example, L. Mullen, ‘Kenya Lawmakers Approve Motion to Withdraw from ICC’, Jurist, 5
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3. Selectivity, Geopolitics and the International Criminal Court
Contemporary international criminal justice institutions, according to the standard
narrative, grew out of geopolitical dynamics and the desire, or the need, to adequately
address mass human rights violations.50 International prosecutions did not become a
workable possibility until the thawing of the Cold War freeze at the UN Security
Council. The outcomes of judicialisation have been predictably inconsistent; there is a
drive to prosecute some of those responsible for some atrocities, but by no means all.
Concerns over selectivity have manifested in response to the inherent exclusivity
involved in the creation of country-specific ad hoc tribunals, as well as politically
contingent approaches to prosecution at the International Criminal Court.
This underlying contestation informs the very nature of each criminal institution
as much as it shapes the relations amongst them. Highly contested decisions taken by
these institutions exemplify the challenges of developing any kind of truly
“international” criminal law. In this sense, little has changed since the post-World
War II military tribunals, when Georg Schwarzenberger argued that the idea of
international criminal law was a contradiction in terms, and that unless or until it
found a way around natural self-interests, it would remain an expression of global
power politics.51 Indeed, the idea of Nuremberg as the birthplace of an international
criminal law is belied by the fact that the big four war-victorious powers appointed a
prosecutor each, rather than the tribunal epitomising any sense of a global community
of nations acting collectively.
Turning to the International Criminal Court and the formal structures set up by
its Statute, a highly contingent process now exists where some situations are subjected
to investigation and prosecution while others are not. The North-South dynamics at
play can be discerned by zeroing in on what has been included and excluded from
those situations before the Court. Questions around how situations are referred to the
International Criminal Court, how the Court takes jurisdiction over situations, and
how the Prosecutor’s discretion is exercised, are pivotal.

For expositions of the rationale for prosecution, see, for example, D. Orentlichert, ‘Settling
Accounts: The Duty To Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime’, 100 Yale Law Journal
(1991) 2539.
51
G. Schwarzenberger, ‘The Problem of an International Criminal Law’, 3 Current Legal Problems
(1950) 263.
50
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Currently, the Court is actively seized of nine situations in which
investigations and or prosecutions are underway, and the Court is pursuing upwards
of 20 cases, all of which involve African states and indictees. A number of these were
self-referrals by African state parties, as successive Prosecutors have been at pains to
point out in defending the Court against claims of geographic and racialised bias. The
Office of the Prosecutor further initiated two proprio motu investigations of its own
volition, in Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire. As such, the critique that the International
Criminal Court operates as a European court to prosecute Africans, rudimentary as it
may be, is supported by practice.
Our present focus, however, is on the Security Council’s particular role and
it’s prerogative power to refer a situation to the Court. The Statute has concretised
three trigger mechanisms to activate the Court’s jurisdiction over particular situations
in Article 13. In instances where the Prosecutor utilises her proprio motu powers, she
must first conclude that there is a reasonable basis to proceed and she must seek
authorisation of the Pre-Trial Chamber under Article 15(3) of the Statute. In instances
of State Party and Security Council referrals, the Prosecutor must conduct a
preliminary investigation and she can determine that there is no basis to proceed as set
out by Article 53 for a whole host of reasons. But her decision not to proceed is
subject to review by the Pre-Trial Chamber in instances of state and Security Council
referrals. With a Security Council referral, the preconditions of jurisdiction
envisioned by Article 12 of Statute become acutely controversial.52 As such, there is
an embedded hierarchy in the Statute’s trigger mechanisms, at the top of which sit
Security Council referrals. The drafters of the Statute placed the Security Council at
the apex because of its “quasi-constitutional” powers within the public international
legal system stemming from the UN Charter.53 Arguably, such referrals are therefore
considered to be the most authoritative. The politics of these types of referrals is thus
significant.
Two of nine situations in the Court’s docket relate to non-party states that
have been referred by the Security Council. For illustrative purposes, we will
juxtapose these two referrals of situations, in Sudan and Libya, with two other

52

C. Safferling, International Criminal Procedure (Oxford University Press, 2012) at 89; A. Cassese,
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potential situations, in Palestine and Sri Lanka, that were brought to the Security
Council’s attention by UN authorities, without the recommended referral resulting.
A. Two Referrals: Sudan & Libya
The impetus towards the Security Council referral of the situation in Darfur to the
International Criminal Court originated in the creation of the International
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur in 2004. Acting under its UN Charter Chapter VII
powers, the Security Council had adopted Resolution 1564 asking the SecretaryGeneral to establish a commission of inquiry, analogous to the ICTY and ICTR
commissions of inquiry. The commission was asked to investigate the violation of
human rights and international humanitarian law, and to determine whether acts of
genocide had been perpetrated by parties to the conflict. The Commission found that
serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law had been
committed, although not acts of genocide, and recommended that the ‘Security
Council immediately refer the situation of Darfur to the International Criminal Court,
pursuant to Article 13(b) of the ICC Statute’.54 In March 2005, the Security Council
referred the situation in Darfur to the Prosecutor in Resolution 1593,55 which did not
explicitly rely on Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute but specified that the referral was
rooted in the Council’s Chapter VII powers.
The Darfur Commission of Inquiry argued that the UN Security Council
through its Chapter VII powers could make the referral to the International Criminal
Court despite Sudan not being a state party. Sudan had previously taken the initial
step of signing the Rome Statute but did not ratify it, and in 2008 informed the
Secretary-General that: ‘Sudan does not intend to become a party to the Rome
Statute. Accordingly, Sudan has no legal obligation arising from its signature on 8
September 2000’.56 In this light, the Security Council referral mechanism can be seen
as an extension of a form of purported universal jurisdiction.
The Darfur referral culminated in the 2007 arrest warrants against Ahmad
Harun, Sudan’s then Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs, and Ali Kushayb,
alleged leader of the Janjaweed militia. In 2009, the Court’s Pre-Trial Chamber issued
54
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the first arrest warrant against a sitting head of state, Sudanese President Omar alBashir, triggering an inevitable backlash against international humanitarian agencies
in Sudan, as well as ongoing debates over immunity and overreach by Ocampo in the
exercise of his missionary mentality to prosecution.
The popular uprising of early 2011 in Libya was met with violent crackdown
by the Gaddafi regime. The UN Human Rights Council established a International
Commission of Inquiry on Libya with the mandate to investigate human rights
violations and international crimes and ‘to make recommendations, in particular, on
accountability measures, all with a view to ensuring that those individuals responsible
are held accountable’.57 The Security Council referred the situation in Libya to the
International Criminal Court in Resolution 1970,58 and soon thereafter authorised air
and naval intervention—to be effected by the north Atlantic powers and their Gulf
allies—in Resolution 1973.59 Upon receiving the referral in March 2011, the Office of
the Prosecutor immediately opened an investigation. By June 2011, the Trial Chamber
issued the requested arrest warrants for Muammar Gaddafi (with the case against him
subsequently terminated following his death), Saif Gaddafi and Abdullah al-Senussi
for crimes against humanity (murder and persecution) allegedly committed across
Libya in February 2011, through the state apparatus and security forces. The swiftness
with which the investigations, indictments and warrants came—in the context of the
coercive referral of a state to which access was limited—is in marked contrast to other
situations, including those involving consenting states, where preliminary
examinations have trundled on for years and have yet to reach a point of
determination.
The referral and the attempts of the International Criminal Court to proceed
against Saif Gaddafi and al-Senussi have been marred by wrangling with the postGaddafi Libyan authorities (and much paternalistic discourse from the Office of the
Prosecutor), who assert their own ability and willingness the prosecute the crimes.
Libya challenged the admissibility of the cases before the International Criminal
Court, successfully in al-Senussi’s case60 and unsuccessfully in Saif Gaddafi’s case.61
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This discrepancy was ostensibly grounded in the notion that Libya’s ability to
prosecute the respective cases was differentiated, at least partially, by the
(internationally recognised) government having control over the Tripoli detention
facility in which al-Senussi was being held, but not that of Saif Gaddafi in Zintan.62
This indicates a very simplistic, if not flawed, understanding on the part of the Court
of the situation left behind by NATO in Libya, one far more complex and fragmented
than a government/opposition binary.
From a geopolitical perspective, the Security Council Darfur and Libya
referrals explicitly excluded the Court’s personal jurisdiction over nationals of nonparty states outside Sudan and Libya, respectively, for any acts or omissions arising
out of military operations authorised by the Council itself.63 The Security Council
referred jurisdiction to the International Criminal Court over Sudanese and Libyan
natives, but not the intervening military forces. In the Libyan case for example, US
troops were involved in the NATO intervention. The implicitly racialised dual
standards are clear. While the technical legal capacity of the Security Council to do
this has been challenged in commentary,64 there has been no suggestion of the
Security Council’s wishes being challenged by the Court. Russian calls for the
International Criminal Court to investigate alleged NATO war crimes in Libya,65 for
instance, have been predictably ignored.

B. Two Non-Referrals: Sri Lanka and Palestine
While aspects of the protracted Sri Lankan ethnic conflict continue to grind on, state
forces defeated the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE or Tamil Tigers) in
2009. There was upwards of 70,000 civilian casualties in the months leading up to
the climax of the violence in May of that same year. The UN Secretary-General and
the former Sri Lankan President, Mahinda Rajapaksa, agreed to a commitment to
redress and accountability. The Secretary-General subsequently appointed a Panel of
Experts to advise him on accountability for the violation of international human rights
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and humanitarian law during the final phrase of the war. The Panel’s recommendation
calls for the establishment of an independent international mechanism to monitor the
Sri Lankan Government’s initiation of accountability proceedings to investigate the
alleged violations and to collect evidence of past crimes. The recommendation,
however, perhaps surprisingly, does not explicitly suggest recourse to the
International Criminal Court.66 And despite demonstrable evidence from the Panel’s
report of the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity by the parties to
the conflict, international criminal justice mechanisms have not been engaged.
With Sri Lanka not being party to the Rome Statute, the only possibility of
operationalising the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction is through a Security
Council referral. As the hostilities came to a devastating conclusion in 2009, the
Security Council could only muster a meek press statement, condemning the LTTE
for its acts of terrorism over many years and demanding their surrender. While
expressing concern at reports of continued use of heavy calibre weapons by state
forces in areas with high concentrations of civilians, the Security Council emphasised
the ‘legitimate right of the Government of Sri Lanka to combat terrorism.’67
Questions of accountability and impunity have not been addressed since then. In
March 2014, the UN Human Rights Council requested the UN High Commissioner
for Human Rights ‘to undertake a comprehensive investigation’ into alleged
international crimes ‘with a view to avoiding impunity and ensuring accountability’.68
International human rights organisations69 and the Tamil diaspora70 remain eager
about the prospect of “delivering justice” and “ending impunity” in Sri Lanka,71 but a
Security Council referral to the International Criminal Court remains beyond the
horizon of likely developments.
In the case of Palestine, the 2009 “Goldstone Report” of the Fact-Finding
Mission commissioned by the UN Human Rights Council, returned findings that the
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Israeli military deliberately targeted civilians and destroyed civilian infrastructure
during its Operation Cast Lead offensive against the Gaza Strip in 2008-2009.72 The
Report recommended that the Security Council refer the situation in Gaza to the
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court pursuant to Article 13(b) of the Rome
Statute.73 No referral was made, despite the analogous nature of the findings and
recommendations of the Fact-Finding Mission with other UN commissions that have
resulted in the creation of ad hoc tribunals or referral to the International Criminal
Court.
The Office of the Prosecutor also played its role in deflecting the possibility of
an investigation into the situation in Palestine. Following the termination of Israel’s
bombardment of the Gaza Strip in 2009, the Palestinian Authority submitted a
declaration to the Registrar of the International Criminal Court accepting the
jurisdiction of the Court, under Article 12(3) of the Rome Statue, over international
crimes committed in Palestine since the Court came into operation on 1 July 2002.74
Whether the Court could accept jurisdiction was considered to hinge on the question
of Palestine’s status – whether it could be considered a state for the purposes of the
Rome Statute. An elaborate consultation process undertaken by the Office of the
Prosecutor – in which it organised roundtables with NGOs and practitioners, pursued
extensive and substantive engagement with the Palestinian legal team and instigated a
dialogue with scholars and legal authorities (resulting in the investment of huge
amounts of time and resources from all parties on the understanding that this was a
genuine and serious process of discovery) – lasted for more than three years.75 The
sum result of this process was two perfunctory paragraphs in a short statement issued
by the Office of the Prosecutor in April 2012, one of the last acts of Ocampo’s tenure,
declaring that it could not decide on Palestine’s competency to grant jurisdiction

‘While the Israeli Government has sought to portray its operations as essentially a response to rocket
attacks in the exercise of its right to self-defence, the Mission considers the plan to have been directed,
at least in part, at a different target: the people of Gaza as a whole.’ Report of the United Nations Fact
Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, UN Doc. A/HRC/12/48, 15 September 2009, § 1883.
73
Ibid., § 1969(e).
74
International Criminal Court (Press Release) ‘Visit of the Minister of Justice of the Palestinian
National Authority, Mr. Ali Khashan, to the ICC’, 22 January 2009. The transfer of jurisdiction dating
back to 2002 would grant the Court the potential to investigate the situation in the West Bank and Gaza
on a broader temporal and geographic scale than solely the crimes committed during Operation Cast
Lead.
75
See further M. Kearney and J. Reynolds, ‘Palestine and the Politics of International Criminal Justice’
in W. Schabas, Y. McDermott, and N. Hayes (eds), The Ashgate Research Companion to International
Criminal Law: Critical Perspectives (Ashgate, 2013), at 407.
72

17

under Article 12(3). Palestine’s statehood was subsequently recognised by the
General Assembly in 2012,76 giving cause to Palestinian civil society organisations to
petition Ocampo’s successor, Fatou Bensouda, to proceed proprio motu on the basis
of the 2009 Article 12(3) declaration. She indicated she would not do so without
either Palestinian ratification of the Rome Statute, or a new Article 12(3)
declaration.77 On the back of much campaigning by Palestinian civil society, the
Palestinian authorities eventually did both ratify the Statute and submit an Article
12(3) declaration in January 2015,78 precipitating an obligatory preliminary
examination of the Office of the Prosecutor. As noted above though, there is no
guarantee that this will result in a full investigation.
Beyond the mechanics by which jurisdiction is triggered, and the inevitable
manoeuvring of the Security Council’s permanent members to protect their allies in
Sri Lanka, Israel and elsewhere, there are also legitimate fears that even if the
International Criminal Court were to investigate these situations, it would not work to
the advantage of Tamils or Palestinians. The institutions of international criminal
justice have displayed scant desire to offer any political-legal antidotes to the
symptoms of imperial relations, whether in Kosovo or Sierra Leone, Libya or
Afghanistan.79
Indeed, if it is the case that the international criminal law project—like
international law more generally—has reproduced colonial legacies more than it has
challenged them, why do Tamils and Palestinians and a diversity of anti-colonial
peoples, social movements and rights activists continue to place faith in international
criminal law institutions as sites of progressive potential? What is there to suggest that
crude stereotypes of African savagery would not be replicated in the form of similarly
racialised depictions of Tamils and Palestinians in international criminal trials, for
instance, as barbarous terrorists?
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4. The Decolonisation of International Criminal Justice?
The first formal Third World Approaches to International Law conference took
place in 1997.80 That same year, Mutua published what can be read as an early
TWAIL appraisal of the ad hoc tribunals.81 Many of the concerns expressed by Mutua
over the nature of international criminal justice remain as valid today as they were
then; some even more so in relation to the inability or unwillingness of the
international criminal law project to grapple with underlying causes of conflict or
unsettle global market forces. Mutua did not foresee the pace at which the
prosecutorial enterprise would crystallise as a central feature of the international legal
landscape, however. In particular, his claim that a permanent International Criminal
Court was unlikely and unviable was quickly overtaken by developments in practice.
Given the biases that have revealed themselves in the Court’s operations, reflection on
the engagement with international criminal law by actors in the global South is
warranted. This entails questions for those social movements and civil society
organisations in the South that retain a faith in the emancipatory potential of criminal
accountability.
There is no single answer to the question of why self-determination
movements such as the Palestinians or the Tamils have articulated support for
international criminal accountability processes. Such peoples and movements are
obviously not monolithic in character. For some within them, there are pragmatic
reasons to invest in international criminal law – as a deterrent and means of protection
against further atrocity, as a form of retribution against the adversary, or in pursuit of
international legitimacy. For others, it is simply the case of a lack of viable
emancipatory alternatives. It is a frustrated turn to legal outlets after civil
disobedience and political insurrection against the violence of the state or the occupier
have failed, or a reflection of the limited avenues available to a self-determination
cause some fifty years after the heyday of national liberation and Third World
decolonisation. For others again, the engagement of international criminal institutions
is a form of tactical intervention, an instrumental move that feeds into a broader antiimperial strategy. Much of the faith placed in international justice by activists in the
global South, however, has been underpinned by a bona fide commitment to
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international law and its unrealised potential. In the Palestinian context there is a
tendency ‘to ascribe a positive quality to international law and thus quarantine it from
any colonial practice through the familiar device of the law/politics binary’. This type
of practice allows for the retention of ‘a quiet confidence in the idea of law as a
weapon of the weak that would work better if only it could be implemented more
effectively.’82
This enforcement deficit argument is an incomplete view of law, however. In
his prose, Mahmoud Darwish captures the more nuanced dichotomy between law’s
content and its form:
You consider the law. How innocent we were to think the law is a vessel for
rights and justice! The law here is a vessel for what the ruler wants, or a suit
that he orders to his own measure. I have been in this country even before the
state that negates my existence came into being. You realize once again that
justice is a hope that resembles an illusion if it is not supported by power and
that power transforms the illusion into a reality.83
Darwish evokes the structural factors and design selectivity at play in, for example,
the role given to the Security Council by the Rome Statute. For peoples in the global
South, the hope of international justice has not been supported by the type of power
needed to transform the illusions of resource redistribution, racial equality or
reparations into reality. Arguably, international criminal justice has been little
different. Despite its overt structural biases, however, little room has been left in
mainstream and even critical legal discourse to challenge the presupposition that there
must be an international criminal law. When considering what the radical response
ought to be in such a situation, the obvious answer might appear to speak in favour of
abandoning or dismantling the institutions of international criminal law altogether.
Where such calls have come, they have tended to come from those writing
from Marxist or anarchist perspectives in the global North. But for writers like
Patricia Williams, there is a critical race element upon which critique of law is
contingent. Williams’ suggests that ‘[r]ights [international law, international criminal
law etc] feels new in the mouths of black people. It is still deliciously empowering to
say. It is the magic wand of visibility and invisibility, of inclusion and exclusion, of
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power and no power”.84 She notes the reliance on the law as mean to construct one’s
identity and formulate one’s demands and rights. This is ultimately rooted in the
anxieties that stem from histories of racial subordination, exclusion and violence.
For peoples traditionally excluded from the sites of international justice and
subjected to imperial violence coupled with impunity, deconstructionist critiques of
international criminal law from the academies of the North (and rhetorical
denouncements from the post-colonial elites of the South) may not speak to their
social and political agendas. While TWAIL scholarship is still perhaps
underdeveloped when it comes to international criminal law specifically, there is
much we can draw from its broader engagement with field of international law, and
its internal reflections and debates.
TWAIL has retained a ‘surprisingly reformist agenda’85 through its reluctance
to depart from the arena of international law. For TWAIL’s critical reconstructionists,
the potential of international law lies in its transformation from below. International
law can be deployed as both shield (against the ongoing impacts of colonial relations)
and sword (in tactical pursuit of progressive or anti-imperial struggle). It is Williams’
magic wand of the oppressed and marginalised. There is also the sense that TWAIL’s
duality of engagement with international law—of both resistance and reform—
coalesce in such a way that there is a possibility to first provide the necessary break
and rupture and then to generate a praxis of (new, or different) universality.86 In this
instance, there is a turn to what may superficially seem like the old in arguing for the
emancipatory potential of international law, as the early post-colonial Third World
jurists did. But underneath lies a radical shift to reflect on the existing dynamics of
power and politics of the everyday life of international law.87 For Bhupinder Chimni,
the reconstruction must take place at different registers, including at the personal and
the ethical.88
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Here then we must consider what radical engagement with the field of
international criminal law, in a bid to transform, subvert or reconstruct—to
decolonise—that field, might look like. Can social movements have the impact on
international criminal law that they have sought to have in other fields of international
law?89 Are international criminal tribunals sites where ‘counter-systemic logics’90 can
be exploited and tactics of rupture91 deployed in such a way as to instrumentalise law
as part of broader socio-political struggles for emancipation from want. Is there space
‘to take advantage of the content of international law to mitigate the effects of its
form’?92
In keeping with the dual engagement paradigm of both resistance and
reconstruction, a decolonisation of international criminal justice might be plausibly
conceived on two distinct, but not necessarily contradictory, registers. This does not
detract from earlier TWAIL interventions that seek to promote national prosecutions
of alleged war criminals in domestic courts either.93 On the reconstructionist register,
redressing three prevailing selectivities94 is paramount: the geographic or group-based
selectivity of situations investigated; the operational selectivity of existing crimes
prosecuted; and the material selectivity of conduct criminalised.
From a Third World perspective, meaningful transformation when it comes to
situation selectivity essentially implies the investigation of crimes committed by
global North forces and their allies in the global South. This would in turn require a
rupture of some description in the referral mechanisms, including the role of the
Security Council, at the design and operational levels.
The operational questions of which crimes are then prosecuted in those
situations can also be subjected to a potential reconstructionist approach. Although
89
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very much a continuation of the lineage of Eurocentric laws of armed conflict and
human rights law, the content of international criminal law does offer certain norms
that, when framed in the post-colonial context, can counter and criminalise
contemporary colonial practices. For example, despite the doctrinal limitations
associated with war crimes with its murky elements of proportionality and necessity
that are susceptible to the so-called fog of war, parts of the normative content of
international criminal law do speak to more systemic elements of colonial projects.
Forcible population transfer and apartheid are marked out as crimes against humanity
under the Rome Statute. Article 8(2)(b)(viii) of the Statute also prohibits the
settlement of occupied territory by an occupying power. As such, settler colonialism
in a context of occupation is rendered criminal. The purpose of this provision is set
out in the commentary to Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention from where
it originates: ‘It is intended to prevent a practice adopted during the Second World
War by certain Powers, which transferred portions of their own population to
occupied territory for political and racial reasons or in order, as they claimed to
colonize those territories. Such transfers worsened the economic situation of the
native population and endangered their separate existence as a race.’95 Although this
exhibits a wilful blindness to colonisation by European powers outside the context of
the Second World War, it nonetheless has a relevance to the land policies and
territorial expansions of the present. Such settler-colonialism is central to concerted
and well-documented Israeli policy in the West Bank (as well as the Golan Heights),
and has the potential to be prosecuted were the International Criminal Court to seize
itself fully of the situation in Palestine. This is certainly central to the thinking of
Palestinian activists and officials, in their attempt to claim “local ownership” of the
process.96 Similar practices are emerging within the context of post-war Sri Lanka as
successive governments forcibly resettle segments of the population from south to
north. If the decolonisation of international criminal law is to have a chance of
proving its emancipatory possibility, then, it might start with the prosecution of
contemporary crimes of colonisation.
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While this might at least begin to get at some of the land control and migration
issues that go to the structural conditions underlying scarcity and inequality, crimes
rooted in the Geneva Conventions will remain limited to traditionally defined and
bracketed armed conflict settings. Any meaningful reconstructionist approach to
international criminal law will need to go further, to the material selectivity of the acts
criminalised at the design level:
if international criminal law is to take seriously the project of international
criminal justice — even if only to prevent further “atrocity” — it must move
beyond its fixation with political and military actors and start to address the
economic context of armed conflict … to address the legality of sanctions
regimes; the role of structural adjustment and austerity programs imposed by
international financial institutions; the competition between China and
Western states for access to resources in third states; or the propriety of
reparations for slavery and colonialism.97
It is clear that the “core crimes” catalogue of genocide, crimes against humanity and
war crimes (plus aggression) are rooted in a restricted conceptualisation of violence.
These crimes cannot any address many of the collective interests of global South
peoples or the structural violence of economic coercion, resource extraction, global
wealth distribution and enforced impoverishment. In addition, there is arguably no
clear normative basis in international criminal law for limiting the definition of crime
in this way;98 for constructing the victim of child soldier recruitment as more
deserving than the child victim of structural adjustment.
Why is mass starvation or grotesque inequality less odious a scourge or more
imaginable an atrocity than the crimes currently being prosecuted? This production of
law is not a neutral process but reflects choices and historical patterns in the
development of international law that have tended to marginalise global South voices
and interests. This was evident over the course of the International Law Commission
(ILC)’s attempts from the 1950s to the 1990s to define and normatively root an
expanded list of international crimes. A minority of global North states (that
consistently supported or abstained from condemning South African apartheid)
maintained their conservative opposition to the inclusion of crimes such as apartheid,
colonialism, and foreign intervention. On account of this, by the end of the process,
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the ILC’s set of 12 crimes had been whittled back down to the four core crimes now
included in the jurisdiction of the ICC.
The subject-matter jurisdiction proposed for the International Criminal Law
Section of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights does gesture towards
redressing this, covering a more expansive list of crimes, some of neocolonial
character, including

mercenarism, corruption, money-laundering,

and illicit

exploitation of natural resources.99 A judicial model such as this cannot avoid
substantively mimicking the European template, however, much as post-colonial
political formations failed to think beyond the European nation-state model.
Decolonisation necessitates decolonising of the mind, and of language.100 The
decolonisation of the field of international criminal justice will remain profoundly
difficult because of the inescapable historical baggage of rule of law civilising
missions, and the homogeneity of international legal language.
Ultimately, in any event, international criminal accountability is not an
emancipatory end in itself for marginalised peoples or self-determination struggles in
the global South. The prosecution of colonial crimes could never be more than a
tactical hook to be pursued as part of a broader anti-colonial strategy. In that sense,
strategic options on the second register of engagement, that of deeper resistance to the
field of international criminal law in its current guise, must be considered in parallel
to the reconstructionist agenda sketched above. This would involve a desubjectification of the global South from Northern legal cultures and a delinking from
global governance structures, drawing on Latin American resistance to the
architecture of international investment law, for example, and from the evolving
organic intellectual traditions of indigenous social movements, alter-globalisation and
decoloniality.101 Here, the continued and concerted subjection of the field of
international criminal justice to postcolonial thought and TWAIL perspectives is
essential.
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